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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
H. Alston Johnson*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

It was a slow year in the legislature in the field of workers' compensation. Depending upon one's point of view, that is great news or
terrible news. Only two changes to the act were passed. The first was
a minor change in the Worker's Compensation Advisory Council.' The
second was of somewhat more importance, and deserves more extended
comment.
Section 1102 of the act had been amended in Act 1 of the First
Extraordinary Session of 1983 to impose some drastic remedies upon
the completion of a settlement with an alleged tortfeasor. The first
segment of the amendments concerned the consequences for an employee
who settled with the tortfeasor without the employer's consent. No
changes were made in 1984 in that language in section 1102(B).
However, the provisions of section 1102(C) relative to the consequences for an alleged tortfeasor who settled an employee's action
without the employer's consent were amended during this past session.
Prior to amendment, if the tortfeasor did not obtain the approval of
the employer or his carrier, and if the employee had not "bought back"
his rights through the reimbursement procedure outlined in section 1102(B),
then the alleged tortfeasor was required to make that reimbursement.
The language of the section appeared to make the reimbursement due
without an opportunity to defend on the merits, and the reimbursement
even included the penalties and attorney's fees that might have been
earned by the employer's own dilatory tactics. On those and other
grounds, the amended sub-section had been the subject of criticism in
2
this Review.
The amendments during this past session correct some of those
problems, but not all. An introductory clause to amended Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1294 seems to indicate that the sub-section applies
only to settlements when litigation is pending. "The provisions apply
when a suit has been filed against a third-party defendant in which the
employer or his insurer has intervened." Thus the suggestion made last
year in this Review that a negotiated settlement prior to suit would
circumvent the sub-section seems to have been accurate.
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
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1.

La. R.S. 23:1294 (Supp. 1984), as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 573, § 1.

2. See Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669, 669-701 (1984).
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The fundamental concept of the sub-section was retained, requiring
that the tortfeasor or his insurer reimburse the compensation carrier in
the event of an unapproved settlement after the initiation of litigation.
However, the requirement that penalties and attorney's fees also be
reimbursed has been deleted, and properly so.
New provisions have been asserted imposing sanctions on an employer or carrier which unreasonably refuses to approve a proffered
settlement. If the refusal to settle is held to be unreasonable, there are
two consequences. First, the credit to which the carrier or employer is
entitled against future compensation will be reduced by fifty per cent
of that portion of a subsequent judgment against the third-party defendant which is in excess of the tendered settlement. Second, the
employee is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the employer
or carrier, calculated from the amount in excess of the settlement offer.
Refusal to accept a settlement which is greater than the discounted value
of future compensation and medical benefits is prima facie unreasonable
3
under the statute.
These amendments seem to have struck a much better balance in
the tripartite relationship among employer/compensation carrier, employee, and tortfeasor/liability insurer, but it remains to be seen how
they will work out in practice. Unfortunately, the amended provision
retains the phrase "third party defendant" to describe the tortfeasor,
when that term will almost certainly not be procedurally correct in all
cases: In fact, the sub-section envisions that the tortfeasor will be the
defendant in the main demand brought by the employee and that the
carrier or the employer will have intervened by an incidental demand.
"Third person" would probably be preferable.
JURISPRUDENCE

International Act Exception
Along with the defense of immunity of the principal discussed below,
the intentional act exception continues to be the hottest topic in workers'
compensation. And as with the executive-officer loophole which preceded
it (the death of which gave rise to the intentional act exception), these
cases are essentially the story of attempted circumvention of the act.
Judicial interpretations of the exception have prompted reactions in this
forum on several previous occasions, 4 and the decisions of this term
have proved to be no exception in that regard.
3. If the employee has sued multiple third parties, the provisions apply to a third
party or parties who actually make a settlement offer.
4. See Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Workers' Compensation, 44
La. L. Rev. 583, 588-90 (1984); Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Workers'
Compensation, 43 La. L. Rev. 613, 626-29 (1983).
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Following the supreme court's decision several years ago in Citizen
v. Daigle,5 most intermediate appellate decisions have exercised a commendably narrow reading of the exception, 6 though there have continued
7
to be some disturbing exceptions.
In a pair of cases decided on the same day during this term, the
supreme court took up the problem again, with dubious results. In brief
opinions in Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc.' and Fallo v. Tuboscope
Inspection,9 Justice Dennis attempted to clarify the scope of the intentional act exclusion. In Mayer, the trial court had sustained the employer's exception of no cause of action because of the conclusory
manner in which the claimant alleged the element of intent. The claimant
merely alleged that the employer's officers knew to a substantial certainty
that their acts in violation of safety regulations would cause an explosion,
injuring him. Similar allegations in other cases had resulted in similar
rulings.' 0 But the court of appeal reversed," partially basing its opinion
on Article 856 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits "malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind" to be pleaded generally.
In light of that provision, the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeal's decision, saying that a general allegation of malice or intent
to do harm would be sufficient in this context to survive an exception
of no cause of action. The court appeared to indicate that summary
judgment rather than a peremptory exception is the appropriate vehicle
to determine this issue, and added "out of caution" that the burden
of proof in prosecuting an intentional tort exception remained unchanged. The claimant must still prove that the alleged tortfeasor "either
(1) consciously desired the physical results of his act or (2) knew that
' 2
that result was substantially certain to follow from that conduct.'
5. 418 So. 2d 598 (La. 1982).
6. Lamaire v. Younger Transp., Inc., 443 SQ. 2d 662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983);
Darville v. Texaco, 442 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 447 So. 2d 473
(La. 1984), reconsideration of grant of cert. denied, 448 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1984); Mize
v. Beker Indus. Corp., 436 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d
761 (La. 1983); Maddie v. Plastic Supply & Fabrication, 434 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 So. 2d 445 (La. 1983); Vidrine v. Stewart & Landry, Inc., 424
So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Wright v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 424 So. 2d 360
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Boudreaux v. Verret, 422 So. 2d 1167 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982);
Buckbee ex rel. Buckbee v. AWECO, Inc., 418 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 So. 2d 166 (La. 1982).
7. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
(exception of no cause of action overruled), aff'd, 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984). See also
Jones v. Thomas, 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983) (holding that employer is vicariously liable
in tort for intentional tort committed by one employee upon another).
8. 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984), aff'g 430 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
9. 444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
10. See cases cited supra note 6.
11. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984).
12. 444 So. 2d at 621.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45

In Fallo, summary judgment was the vehicle used, and the appellate
court reversed a summary judgment in the employer's favor. 3 By doing
so, the intermediate appellate court admitted the possibility of recovery
by an employee when the injury was caused by the act of a co-employee
which he "should have known" would produce the harmful consequences. The supreme court termed this holding "clear error," restating
the requisites it had enunciated in Mayer.
This slight change of signals at the supreme court level was promptly
followed by one appellate court' 4-though others seemed unaware of it
or not moved by it in the cases before them, even though all of these
latter cases were disposed of by summary judgment rather than by
1 5
peremptory exception.
It may be that the court's intent in Mayer was simply to indicate
that disposition of claims under the intentional act exception should
rarely, if ever, be made by the peremptory exception device, and that
summary judgment is a much more appropriate vehicle for that purpose.
If so, there is perhaps little reason to quarrel with that result, though
inevitably employers and carriers will find it more expedient to dispose
of such claims even though they are clearly without merit.
But, to the extent that the court may have meant in Mayer to
indicate some softening of the requirements for success on the merits
in an intentional-act case, 16 some respectful criticism may be in order.
The language of the intentional-act exception is already rather broad
when compared to that of some other states. 17 Louisiana chose complete
13. Fallo v. Tuboscope Inspection, 435 So. 2d 1033 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983), rev'd,
444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
14. Fabre v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 446 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984) (The court declined to approve sustaining of exception of no cause of action;
claimant alleged contraction of lung cancer from toxic materials, and that defendants
knowingly concealed information and intentionally deprived him of necessary protective
equipment even though knowing "full well" that claimant's injuries were "certain" to
follow.). See also Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.
1984) (The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted by the trial court
but was reversed by the appellate court, which indicated that summary judgment would
be a more appropriate vehicle.).
15. Walker v. Grantham, 449 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So.
2d 966 (La. 1984) (summary judgment affirmed; court said term "substantially certain"
might be restated as "virtually sure" or "nearly inevitable"); Manning v. Better Way
Coatings, Inc., 448 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 966 (La.
1984) (summary judgment affirmed); McDonald v. Reeves Transp. Co., 448 So. 2d 217
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (summary judgment affirmed; chain being used to tow disabled
truck broke).
16. Could this be the court's conscious or subconscious reaction to the pro-employer
cast to the act after the 1983 amendments? The writer predicted such a reaction as a
possibility, see Johnson, supra note 2, at 681 n.41.
17. In California, for example, an employee may bring a tort action in this factual
context only when his injury or death is "proximately caused by a willful physical assault
by the employer." Such language would appear to limit tort claims to instances of conduct
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escape from the Act as a remedy for commission of an intentional act
rather than some percentage increase in compensation. Judicial broadening of the concept will do serious damage to the exclusivity of the
act, and will put Louisiana back in the unfortunate situation in which
it found itself in with the executive-officer suits. Such a result is to be
avoided assiduously.
The view on the merits taken in Babin v. Edwards"s is much preferable. The claimants were working in a shipyard welding together steel
plates that may or may not have been adequately secured for the welding
process. Claimants had alleged that their supervisors knew of the danger
in working near the allegedly inadequately secured plates and that they
were ordered by their supervisors to work there in spite of that knowledge. There was also some evidence of previous run-ins between the
claimants and the supervisors and inferences of malevolent intent might
have been drawn from those earlier incidents. A trial on the merits had
resulted in a large judgment in the claimants' favor.
The appellate court reversed and dismissed. Citing the two-part
statement in Mayer and Fallo as its guide, the court attempted to clarify
the confusion surrounding the "substantially certain" portion of the
test. The court held that this formulation is not an additional exception,
but merely a method of proving an intentional act.' 9 The court said:
In sum, in order to avoid the exclusive remedy of worker's
compensation, a defendant must act with an intent to injure
the plaintiff. This intent can be shown either by proving the
defendant acted with a desire to harm plaintiff or by proving
that defendant acted with knowledge of facts that from his act
plaintiff's injury was substantially certain to result. Fallo, 444
So. 2d at 622. "Substantially certain" is not an alternative to
"intentional act". It is a method of proving that the act was
intentional. Fallo makes it clear that this is the correct interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1032.
Applying that standard, the court held that the claimants had not
established either that the officers subjectively desired the harmful consequences or that they knew to a virtual certainty that such consequences
would follow their conduct. Thus a reversal of the trial court award
was required.
Clearly, the final chapter on this subject has yet to be written. One
is entitled to hope, however, that the sensible view of the matter taken
by an individual (human) employer, not by a co-employee for whom a corporate employer
has vicarious liability, as was held in Jones v. Thomas, 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983).
18. 456 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
19. The court quoted the earlier, but certainly not novel, formulation of this standard
of proof contained in Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Workers' Compensation, 42 La. L. Rev. 620, 630 (1982).
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in Babin will prove influential when the supreme court next addresses
the problem.
Judicial Uneasiness With Immunity of Principal
Some of the decisions during this term seem to indicate a certain
judicial uneasiness with the immunity of a principal, especially in light
of its applicability to a principal which has no realistic risk of ever
having to pay compensation or even having to purchase insurance to
protect it against that possibility. The uneasiness is demonstrated in cases
discussing the breadth of the notion of the "trade, business, or occupation" of the principal.
Certainly the prime example is the opinion on re-hearing in Lewis
v. Exxon Corp.20 Both the trial court and the appellate court2" had
determined that Exxon was the statutory employer of the claimant, who
was actually employed by H. E. Wiese, Inc., on a construction project
at the Exxon facility. In its original opinion, the supreme court had
agreed with these two courts, apparently on the basis that the work
project on which the claimant was injured should be considered a
renovation project rather than new construction in light of the fact that
a minor portion of the total cost was new capital investment. On
rehearing, the court took a different view, reversing the two lower courts.
It determined that Exxon was not a principal, and therefore did not
enjoy tort immunity.
The supreme court emphasized the history of the Exxon plant in
Baton Rouge, and noted that twenty years ago, Exxon had decided to
get out of the construction business. It had made only one exception
to that policy (in 1970, following a fire), and the court regarded that
as an extraordinary situation. The court observed that: (1) no regular
Exxon employees were engaged in the project in which the claimant was
injured; (2) Exxon had not used its own employees in a project of this
type in 20 years; and (3) Exxon could not have performed the work
that the claimant's employer was doing and still maintained the normal
operations of its chemical plant with its then current staff.
The supreme court thus returned to its theme in the decision in
Thompson v. South Central Bell Telephone Co. 22 of carefully scrutinizing
the assertion of the alleged principal that it "could" have done the
work with its own people. The result in Lewis was foreshadowed in
Thompson for those who cared to look.
The majority opinion on rehearing also contains the statement that
"whenever a principal contracts to perform work for another-even if
it is the first and only time that the principal plans to engage in such
20.
21.
22.

441 So. 2d 192 (La. 1983)
Lewis v. Exxon, 417 So. 2d 1292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
411 So. 2d 26 (La. 1982).
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a project-he is, for the purposes of injuries resulting from that project,
engaged in that trade, business or occupation.' '23 Several appellate courts
had similarly expressed themselves. 24 Concurring in the result, Justice
Dennis objected to the statement as dicta and as a "debatable proposition. "1

Decisions of the intermediate courts demonstrate some of the
uneasiness 26 as do the federal decisions, 27 though there are certainly still

2
instances of a traditionally broad reading of the immunity provision. 1
Other forums have not been free of the discussion, with movement both

on the state legislative front 29 and at the level of the United States

Supreme Court with reference to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work30
ers' Compensation Act.
It would not be surprising to see the subject become the focus of

increasing discussion and scrutiny in the very near future. In light of
the contractual arrangements now existing in many fields of employment
in which the issue of the immunity of the principal would be presented,

there is serious doubt that the broad reach of the immunity is as fair
as it may have seemed to be when the immunity was granted-first by
judicial decision and later by legislative codification.
Gradual Mental Stress
Taquino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." is an interesting decision which
23. 441 So. 2d at 198.
24. See Wells v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways, 450 So. 2d 1027 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1984); Richard v. Weill Constr. Co., 446 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 449 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1984); Barnhill v. American Well Serv. & Salvage, Inc.,
432 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
25. 441 So. 2d at 200.
26. See Boudreaux v. Exxon, 441 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
27. See Chavers v. Exxon, 716 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1983).
28. Certain v. Equitable Equip. Co., 453 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Butler
v. Home Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Dusenbery v. McMoran
Exploration Co., 433 So. 2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
29. See La. H.B. No. 871 (1984), which was reported with amendments by committee
in the house of origin but did not progress further, would have removed the immunity
of a principal when the immediate employer of a person had "lawfully secured the
payment of worker's compensation benefits to his employers or is covered by worker's
compensation insurance . . . while the work to be undertaken is in progress and the
injury is sustained ....
." In such an instance the principal (though not his officers,
directors, or employees) would be considered a "third party" susceptible of being sued
in tort.
30. This movement, however, appears to have been in the opposite direction. Interpreting a section which, by its literal terms, might not have extended to an entity defined
as a principal by the Louisiana statute, the Supreme Court in Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2827 (1984), granted immunity to a contractor
which had voluntarily provided workers' compensation coverage to employees of subcontractors though not statutorily bound to do so.
31. 438 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 597 (La. 1983).
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may reflect judicial movement toward acceptance of the concept of
gradual mental stress without specific physical origin. The claimant had
been a salesman for Sears, Roebuck over a thirty-year period with only
a short gap of two years in the early 1960's. His petition claimed that
he was disabled from mental causes due to his transfer from one Sears
store to another, a reduction in commissions and base pay, and an
"inordinate amount of pressure" from his superiors. The trial court
sustained an exception of no cause of action without assigning reasons.
The appellate court treated the case as one of first impression, and
accurately observed that the rationale of the decision in Ferguson v.
HDE, Inc.3 2 had broadened the concept of accident substantially, perhaps
to a point sufficient to encompass the assertion made by the claimant.
The court also noted the recent rejection of a mental disability claim
in Franklin v. Complete Auto Transit Co.," but expressed its disagreement with the reasoning in that decision (which had focused upon
whether mental disability could possibly be classified as an accident
under the act).
The court did not observe that in Ferguson the mental stress (reaction
to paycheck thought to be erroneously low) and the physical manifestation (stroke) were only moments apart, nor that the mental/physical
sequence of events made the occurrence of the disabling incident very
easy to pinpoint. It also did not cite the decision in McDonald v.
International Paper Co., 34 a more recent extension of Ferguson to a
mental/physical sequence in which the fatal heart attack followed approximately two weeks of stress. Observations about these two decisions
might have highlighted the distinction between those types of decisions
and the matter at hand in Taquino, and would have enabled the court
to see more clearly the pitfalls of the road upon which it was embarking.
The Taquino decision may start Louisiana upon the path of the
most puzzling type of claim: the so-called gradual mental trauma/gradual
mentally disabling consequence case. We are somewhat familiar with the
physical trauma/mental disability 35cases, and with the acute mental
trauma/mental disability cases.36 Except through the experiences of other
jurisdictions, we are not familiar with the gradual mental disability
37
cases.
32. 260 La. 409, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972).
33. 397 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981). In Franklin, however, there was evidence
of physical trauma preceding the alleged mental disability. In Taquino, there was no
indication of physical trauma with mental consequences, which arguably makes the case
even more tenuous than Franklin.
34. 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981).
35. See 1 W. Malone & A. Johnson, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice §
235, at 511-13, in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
36. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
37. See Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
The Carter decision and a few others like it are cited by the court in Taquino.
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Having said all of that, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the
court's disposition of the case as it stood. An exception of no cause
of action, especially without reasons assigned therefore, is a drastic
means of resolution of a controversy of this nature. The opinion does
not reflect the period of time over which the gradual mental stresses
nor the gradual mental disability may have occurred. The shorter that
period of time may have been, the easier it would be for the judiciary
to make a comfortable judgment about the causal relationship which
must be demonstrated between employment and disabling incident. Conversely, if the period of time which elapsed was rather long, the sources
of stress become quite diffuse and the accuracy of a judicial determi38
nation of causation becomes concomitantly more difficult.
It may have been, and so it seems from the opinion, that the
appellate court was reacting primarily to the inference in the sustaining
of the exception that an emotional injury absent some accompanying
physical injury could never qualify as an accident under the act. On
that point, the court's refusal to approve the sustaining of the peremptory
exception seems entirely correct. These comments are intended as a plea
for caution, should this matter return or a similar one arise. Identification
of the causes for the stress and the disability will be very difficult, and
we should be prepared to devote a considerable amount of judicial and
scholarly attention to developing a scheme to help us resolve such
inquiries.
Determination of Post-Injury Wages
The decision in Lafleur v. Hartford Insurance Co. 39 reveals a flaw
in the legislation that escaped detection at the time of enactment, though
once the factual situation which it contemplates appears it seems perfectly
obvious that the problem should have been dealt with. It was generally
conceded by the employer that the claimant had been injured on the
job and was entitled to some compensation (subject to the weekly
maximum amount of $148.00). The employer disputed the extent of the
disability, but the appellate court upheld the trial court's determination
that benefits were due on the basis of permanent partial disability.
That decision brought the court to the real core of the dispute.
Under the statute as it then read, the employer was required to pay
two thirds of the difference between the pre-injury and post-injury wage
of the employee. Specifically, the language identified the pertinent amounts
as the prior wage and "any lesser wages which the injured employee
actually earns in any week thereafter . . . . "40 Trouble was, the claimant
had opened a small restaurant with his wife after his injury, and was
38.
39.
40.

See Malone & Johnson, supra note 35, § 217 (Supp. 1984).
449 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
La. R.S. 23:1221(3) (1975), as it read prior to the 1983 amendments.
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not receiving a weekly wage at all. At best, the net profits of the
business could be determined on an annual basis.
The restaurant business was apparently a community asset owned
by the claimant and his wife. However, the insurance carrier contended
that the claimant's post-injury earnings should be calculated on the basis
of the entirety of the profits derived from the business without deduction
of the wife's one-half interest. The court correctly observed that if his
wife had not worked in the business with him, the claimant would have
had to take a partner or hire an employee, and the remuneration paid
to such a partner or employee would clearly have been deducted from
the claimant's remuneration. Thus the accurate calculation of the claimant's post-injury "wages" would be his one half of the profits. The
court also rejected the contention that certain other payments to the
claimant should be considered compensation, since it concluded that the
evidence established that these payments were merely reimbursement for
41
various expenses he incurred.
This left the court to grapple with the problem of converting the
annual profit into a "weekly wage," and with the procedural problem
of the manner in which the carrier was to ascertain from week to week
what its appropriate payment would be. Predictably, the court indicated
that a division of the yearly profit by 52 would be an equitable fashion
of determining the "weekly wage" for these purposes. 42 On a more
practical level, the court strongly suggested the parties might amicably
agree to a procedure under which monthly profits in the business would
be calculated and monthly checks issued. The claimant had indicated
in brief that such an arrangement would be acceptable.
The court's solution is certainly acceptable and fair, and finds some
support in the changes made in the partial disability section (now supplemental earnings benefits) after the 1983 amendments. The calculation
of post-injury wages is now to be made on a monthly basis, although
the change was probably not made because of the problems presented
in a case like Lafleur.43 The difficulties encountered by the court in
devising some scheme for month-to-month supervision of the appropriate
amount point up the importance of having an administrative scheme
outside the judicial process. This would be an appropriate function for
the office of the Director to assume.

41. The claimant used a van to transport certain commodities, and was reimbursed
for those expenses. There were also certain expenditures for group insurance, but the
carrier had not presented sufficient evidence for the court to determine that these should
be considered a part of the claimant's compensation.
42. See La. R.S. 23:1021(11) (1984) and La. R.S. 23:1021(10) (1984), which use such
a calculation to reach a weekly wage from an annual salary.
43. See Malone & Johnson, supra note 35, § 275, at 78 n.69.40 (Supp. 1984),
suggesting that one of the reasons may have been a slight reduction of benefits in some
cases.
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CASES PRIOR TO

1983

AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN

No

RECOVERY IF AMENDMENTS APPLICABLE

It was suggested in an earlier article in this Review 4 that the amendments made in 1983 to the scheduled loss benefit section would result
in a denial of benefits in certain cases in which an award of benefits
would have been permitted under the pre-1983 provisions. The amendments require that any disability rating to a member must be greater
than 50%. Amendments to section 1221(4)(p) relative to impairment of
physical function eliminated any award for such loss of function of the
back.
Cases applying the law as it reads after the 1983 amendments have
not yet appeared, but in a series of decisions during this term, the above
prediction proved accurate. Since these cases arose prior to the amendments, benefits were appropriately awarded. But had they arisen after
the amendments became effective, benefits would have been denied either
on the basis that the loss of function was to the back or on the basis
that the impairment of the member under the schedule was less than
45
fifty per cent.
44. See Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669 (1984).
45. See Keller v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 453 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1984) (injury in 1978; 30% disability of knee); Woodard v. George Cole Chevrolet,
Inc., 444 So. 2d 1367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (back injury resulting in 15% impairment
to the body as a whole; award under schedule; injury in 1980); Hayward v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 441 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (10% impairment of thumb,
20% of index finger, and 5% of hand as a whole; benefits accordingly; injury in 1981);
Martin v. Emerson Elec. Co., 437 So. 2d 910 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (The claimant
suffered low back injuries in 1980; he received partial disability benefits until released to
return to work; if unable to prove partial disability, a future claimant similarly situated
would receive no benefits.); Parks v. Louisiana Health Care Assn., 436 So. 2d 693 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 1220 (La. 1983) (involving 400o impairment of
finger and 6% of hand; injury in 1981; schedule loss to finger which was awarded would
not be awardable after 1983 amendments).
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